



# Department of State

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TELEGRAM

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S/S-O:TRREYNERS:E0  
10/22/80 22466  
S/S-O:TRREYNERS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A, 10-105

*Classified*  
*PPM*  
*DR. DR.*  
*CO. 12*  
*11/3/83*

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ROUTINE

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CFR REPORT. INFORM CONSULS. CINC/SHAPE FOR POLADS ONLY

E.O. 12065: GDS 10/22/86 (TARNOFF, PETER)

TAGS: XX, US

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## (U) TABLE OF CONTENTS

	PAGE
1. EUR - GREECE REJOINS NATO'S MILITARY STRUCTURE	2
2. EUR - CSCE: DEADLOCK IN MADRID	3
3. EUR - NEW ITALIAN GOVERNMENT: CONTINUITY	5
4. INR - USSR-AFGHANISTAN: THE BABRAK KARMAL VISIT	6
5. ENEA - SYRIAN-SOVIET FRIENDSHIP TREATY	8
6. PA - AMERICANS FAVOR LOW U.S. PROFILE DURING IRAN-IRAQ CONFLICT	9
7. IO - SECURITY COUNCIL ELECTIONS	11
8. EARA - NICARAGUA: LOAN AGREEMENT SIGNED	12
9. EARA - EL SALVADOR: DRAMATIC ANNOUNCEMENTS MARK REVOLUTION'S ANNIVERSARY	13
10. EEA - TERRORIST BOMBING IN MANILA	15
11. EEA - AUSTRALIAN FEDERAL ELECTIONS HELD OCT 18	15

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4. (U) INR - USSR-AFGHANISTAN: THE BABRAK KARMAL VISIT  
(GDS 10/22/86)

(C) THE SOVIETS USED BABRAK KARMAL'S OCTOBER 16 MOSCOW VISIT TO REAFFIRM THEIR SUPPORT FOR HIM AND FOR THE AFGHAN PEACE PLAN OF MAY 14. ALTHOUGH NO CHANGE IN THE SOVIET MILITARY INVOLVEMENT WAS FORESHADOWED, MOSCOW APPARENTLY STILL HOPES TO SEE KARMAL'S HOLD ON POWER STRENGTHENED AND THE PARHAM-KHALQ RIFT HEALED.

(C) A MAJOR SOVIET PURPOSE IN SCHEDULING THE VISIT AT THIS TIME WAS TO ENHANCE THE RESPECTABILITY OF BABRAK KARMAL'S REGIME IN INTERNATIONAL OPINION AND TO GIVE THE REGIME AN AURA OF LEGITIMACY THAT MIGHT AFFECT FAVORABLY SOME COUNTRIES' VOTES AT THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY. (THE UN DEBATE ON AFGHANISTAN IS DUE TO BEGIN IN EARLY NOVEMBER.)

(C) THE SOVIETS WELCOMED KARMAL WITH THE FULL HONORS ACCORDED CHIEFS OF STATE AND SAID HIS VISIT TOOK PLACE IN "AN ATMOSPHERE OF SINCERITY AND COMPLETE MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING." BREZHNEV SOUGHT TO REINFORCE THE IMPRESSION OF TOTAL HARMONY BY CLAIMING THAT A "FULL IDENTITY OF VIEWS" EXISTED BETWEEN MOSCOW AND KABUL.

(C) ON INTERNATIONAL ISSUES, BREZHNEV AND KARMAL RE-AFFIRMED THEIR GOVERNMENTS' SUPPORT FOR THE MAY 14 PEACE PLAN AND STRESSED THAT BILATERAL TALKS WITH PAKISTAN WERE THE KEY TO ITS SUCCESS. BREZHNEV SHARPLY ATTACKED THE US FOR SLANDERING THE USSR AND USING THE AFGHAN SITUATION AS A PRETEXT FOR A RETURN TO THE COLD WAR IN ORDER TO JUSTIFY ITS MILITARY ACTIVITY IN THE REGION. BOTH LEADERS CALLED FOR AN IMMEDIATE POLITICAL SETTLEMENT OF THE IRAQ-IRAQ CONFLICT.

(C) BOTH THE SOVIETS AND AFGHANS EVIDENTLY PAID CONSIDERABLE ATTENTION TO MILITARY AFFAIRS AND INTERNAL AFGHAN SECURITY DURING THE MOSCOW TALKS. ALTHOUGH THE SOVIETS PLEDGED CONTINUED MILITARY SUPPORT IN THE FACE OF ALLEGED OUTSIDE AGGRESSION, THERE WAS NO HINT OF ANY MAJOR INCREASE IN SOVIET FORCES; INDEED, BREZHNEV'S EMPHASIS ON THE RETURN OF THE "SITUATION IN THE COUNTRY TO NORMAL" SUGGESTED THAT FOR THE MOMENT AT LEAST MOSCOW WAS PLANNING NO NEW MILITARY MOVES.

(C) BREZHNEV ALSO CLAIMED THAT THE AFGHAN REVOLUTION WAS "IRREVERSIBLE" AND "EXPRESSED SOLIDARITY" WITH THE RULING PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF AFGHANISTAN (PDPA), THE "VANGUARD" OF THE AFGHAN PEOPLE. KARMAL IN RETURN CLAIMED THAT "PRIORITY ATTENTION" WAS BEING PAID TO THE GROWTH AND

SECRET

DEVELOPMENT OF THE PARTY OF "THE NEW TYPE" AND ADMITTED THAT THE PDPA WOULD DRAW ON THE EXPERIENCE OF "LEGITIMATE PARTIES," IMPLYING THAT THE PDPA, ALTHOUGH STILL NOT RECOGNIZED BY MOSCOW AS A COMMUNIST PARTY, WAS NONETHELESS A PARTY IN THE MARXIST-LENINIST MOLD.

(C) KARMAL'S CLAIM THAT "DEVIATION FROM THE CORRECT PATH" WOULD NOT BE TOLERATED WAS PROBABLY MEANT AS A WARNING TO HIS KHALQI FOES. THE SOVIETS DID NOT ECHO THIS, HOWEVER; RATHER, THEY NOTED THE CONTINUED NEED TO BROADEN THE BASE OF THE PDPA AND ITS LINKS WITH THE PEOPLE.